# 1AR Dartmouth RR Round 3

## Advantage 2

## Advantage 1

## Codetermination CP

### AT Overivew

### Ban CBR plank

### Readiness plank

### Codetermination plank

#### That alsoproves triggeesr DA – didn’t say “links to nB in 2CA but makde this argument which is the same

Hammond 18 – Director of Social Policy at the Niskanen Center, former Fellow at the Mercatus Center, M.A. in Economics from Carleton University, M.A. in Economics from George Mason University.

Samuel Hammond, “Elizabeth Warren’s Corporate Catastrophe,” National Review, 08-20-2018, https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/08/elizabeth-warren-accountable-capitalism-act-terrible-idea/

Milton Friedman was simply wrong, descriptively and prescriptively. That does not mean, however, that Warren and Yglesias’s alternative theory of corporate social responsibility — what philosophers call “stakeholders theory” — is a good idea. As the influential business ethicist Kenneth Goodpaster once observed, simply multiplying the number of stakeholders blurs traditional goals in terms of entrepreneurial risk-taking, pushes decision-making towards paralysis because of the dilemmas posed by divided loyalties and, in the final analysis, represents nothing less than the conversion of the modern private corporation into a public institution.

This raises the question of why we have private corporations in the first place. Ever since the late Ronald Coase published his famous theory of the firm, economists have tended to argue for a view grounded in public policy. Namely, shareholder corporations dominate modern economies because they are, as a nexus of contracts, much more efficient at pooling capital and directing resources than any competing organizational form. Thus the normative foundation of corporate law is not any subset of stakeholders, but the welfare of society as a whole.

Business ethicist John Boatright makes the point a bit differently, noting that through bargaining, “any constituency or stakeholder group could conceivably make its interests the objective of the firm and the end of management’s fiduciary duty.” The fact that shareholders tend to bargain hardest for formal control simply stems from their greater exposure to losses as residual claimants.

Enforcing co-determination rules doesn’t change this fact. On the contrary, when scandal struck Volkswagen in 2005, the blame was laid squarely at co-determination’s feet. Members of Volkswagen’s supervisory board, widely seen as an “old-boys network” in its own right, were caught exchanging favors, including access to prostitutes, in exchange for union-member votes. It turns out Coase’s theory drives a hard bargain.

As the Democratic party debates whether or not to embrace “democratic socialism,” Warren, to her credit, claims she’s “a capitalist to my bones.” Yet the fact remains that the Accountable Capitalism Act is in many ways the most radical proposal advanced by a mainstream Democratic lawmaker to date. Not because Germany is a socialist dystopia, but because, unlike universal health care or increased spending on the poor, Warren’s proposal is to fundamentally upend the way the most productive companies in the American economy work from the top down.

Forget “If you like your doctor, you can keep your doctor.” Warren’s plan will have you asking if you can keep your retirement savings. As Yglesias notes in his piece, co-determination could cause average share prices to plummet by as much as 25 percent. But don’t worry, says Yglesias: “Cheaper stock would be offset by higher pay and more rights at work.”

Maybe. Or maybe, after the dust settles, we would find ourselves in a new, lower equilibrium — one with less inequality, perhaps, but even lower productivity, as America’s corporate unicorns are converted into glitter glue.

A wise person once said that a model based on preventing the worst-case scenario risks stopping the best-case scenario from ever coming about. The American system, whatever its flaws, is exceptional in its openness to visionaries. Warren’s plan, based on bad economics and worse business ethics, is nothing short of a plan to hold those with vision to account.

#### It squashes investment in startups.

Epstein 18 – Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law at New York University Law School, Senior Lecturer at the University of Chicago, LLB from Yale Law School.

Richard A. Epstein, “Elizabeth Warren’s Surreptitious Socialism,” Hoover Institution, 08-20-2018, https://www.hoover.org/research/elizabeth-warrens-surreptitious-socialism

Warren also misunderstands why it is a welcome development for corporations to increase their distributions to shareholders. These large distributions are not typically used for ostentatious consumption, but are reinvested in new businesses, often start-ups that carry both greater risks and greater returns. Successful firms create new opportunities for all of Warren’s stakeholders. Indeed, we should look askance at firms that harbor capital for low-value uses in order to pad the position of its corporate leaders. Decentralized capital allocations by many independent actors may well outperform large firms in innovative activities. Adroit small firms are able to turn on a dime to seize new opportunities. When the businesses grow larger, the original investors can sell their stock in an initial public offering, take their winnings, and start another high-risk venture. An increase in cash distribution is a good marker of increased competition. One telltale sign of this positive development is that the per-share value of corporations tends to increase with large distributions, so that everyone gains.

#### It raises firm cost

Constain 19 – Contributor at the Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law, J.D. Candidate at Fordham University.

Julian Constain, “A New Standard for Governance: Reflections on Worker Representation in the United States,” Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law, https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1475&context=jcfl

Scholars posit that adopting codetermination will result in a net increase in operating costs. 144 Theoretically, this newly-established “heterogeneity of interests”—as opposed to the unilateral system of board and management—will increase both the costs of decision-making and the agency costs related to overseeing management.145

By having anything other than a unilaterally-operated board, firms will have to expend additional funds when making important decisions, since more interests need to be taken into account to get the necessary votes.146 Even in systems without quasi-parity codetermination, worker representatives have the opportunity to “hold up” board proceedings by voicing their opinions, which takes up time and results in increased opportunity costs. 147 Such a diversity of interests is also thought to increase agency costs, as “it will be more difficult for a . . . board of diverse and conflicting interests to monitor management.” 148 Accordingly, mandatory codetermination may lead to increased agency costs for firms.

#### It zeros business growth across the board.

Allegaert 20 – J.D. from New York University, M.A. from Leipzig University.

Pierre Allegaert, “Codetermination and ESG: Viable Alternatives to Shareholder Primacy,” International Law and Politics, 06-16-2020, https://www.nyujilp.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/NYI206-1.pdf

Allowing one particular stakeholder—in this case, labor— to have a say in board decisions presents its own problems. While the U.S.-style unitary board maintains “flexibility and responsiveness” in order to “institute change quickly and take painful measures such as restructuring . . . . [T]he codetermined board . . . is unable to pursue shareholder value with the same vigour and instead must engage in ‘sub optimal compromises’ and ‘corporatist’ decision-making by appeasing the labour representatives.”103 Instead, the “possibilities on the shareholder side are correspondingly weakened,” and a decision making process which requires consensus between labor and capital, given their frequently divergent interest, is “more costly and slow.”104 The codetermined firm may “avoid painful measures such as redundancies, restructuring and plant closure . . . due to the inherently conservative interests of labour members.”105 These conflicts could ultimately lead to a reduction in capital stock, increased unemployment, decreased incomes, and a general decrease in output and a country’s prosperity.106 The firm that “keeps a relatively inefficient plant in operation, for example, . . . may have to charge more than competitors, lose business, and eventually be forced to change its practices or seek a governmental bailout.”107

#### Unions are key.

Lindvall 13 – August Röhss Chair in Political Science at the University of Gothenburg while specializing in comparative politics, political economy, and political history.

Johannes Lindvall, “Union Density and Political Strikes,” World Politics, Vol. 65, No. 3, 2013, https://lucris.lub.lu.se/ws/files/2168838/4696387.pdf

The second part of my argument concerns countries with strong trade union movements, where I also expect the likelihood of political strikes to be low, but for very different reasons: unlike weak unions, which do not strike because they are unable to, strong unions do not strike be- cause they do not need to.

An open confrontation with a strong union movement would be politically costly for any government (particularly if it should lose). hence, governments in countries with strong union movements are aware of the latent threat the unions pose and therefore have pow- erful incentives to seek compromises on controversial policy issues in order to avert strikes or other protests. Similarly, unions have strong reasons not to strike if they are able to win concessions from govern- ments through the mere threat of strikes.5 The most likely outcome of political disagreements between governments and unions in countries with strong union movements is therefore that they reach compromis- es, open or tacit, on the principal policy issues that divide them. This is not to imply that unions always have their way, but only to suggest that governments will modify their policies and policy proposals where this is necessary to avoid protests.

The literature on social movements, which I relied on above, is chiefly concerned with how social movement organizations acquire the capacity for protest in the first place, not with how strong organiza- tions use their power. The second part of my argument therefore relies on two other literatures: on the one hand, the comparative and theo- retical literature on class politics and organizational power resources; on the other hand, the empirical literature on corporatist arrangements in countries with strong union movements, such as those in the Nordic region.6 As these literatures have demonstrated, governments in coun- tries with powerful unions have had strong reasons to provide the main trade union confederations with some measure of political power and influence at the decision-making stage rather than having to endure the constant threat of strikes and protests. Walter Korpi and Michael Shalev have argued, for example, that where the working class is politi- cally strong, it tends to shift its “conflict strategy” from the economic to the political realm, resorting to strikes less often. This argument con- cerned ordinary economic strikes, not political strikes, but the basic point should apply to the problem examined here.7

Compromises between governments and unions can take different forms depending on the political circumstances. The studies from the 1970s and 1980s cited above emphasized the historical linkage be- tween trade unions and social democratic parties. As the empirical sec- tions of this article will show, however, political strikes are rare at high levels of union density regardless of the ideological composition of the government, suggesting that all governments have reason to seek some form of accommodation with the trade unions if the trade union move- ment is very strong.

As unions grow stronger, I therefore expect political strike activity to gradually decrease.

#### Collective bargaining fosters peace not strikes.

Steinberg 94 – Staff Attorney at the Office of Hearings and Appeals in the United States Department of Energy and L.L.M in Labor and Employment Law from Georgetown University Law Center.

Terry Nicole Steinberg, “Rival Union Access to Public Employees: A New First Amendment Balancing Test,” George Mason Independent Law Review, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 361-428, Spring 1994, https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/gmlr2&div=17&g\_sent=1&casa\_token=&collection=journals

Equal bargaining power, then, can be a legitimate labor relations goal when either the employee or employer is perceived as weak. Al- though these sources show how labor peace emanates from equal bar- gaining power, labor peace is more than the end result. Labor peace also may be seen as a separate goal from the equalization of power between unions and management, however, that approach omits the process by and structure through which the parties become equal. That structure and process is collective bargaining. The collective bargaining process itself fosters labor peace, because disputes are channeled into the negotiating process, away from labor strikes. Strengthening col-lective bargaining, then, furthers labor peace.

### Surveillance plank

### Strikes plank

### AI and biotech plakn

### Waivers plank

## Antitrust CP

## Bankruptcy DA

### Case Turns DA---1AR

### CP---1AR

### Collapse Inev---1AR

### No Link---1AR

#### They hate labor

Budow 21 – Labor and Employment Attorney, Kauff McGuire & Margolis LLP, and Adjunct Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law

Scott A. Budow, “How the Roberts Court Has Changed Labor and Employment Law,” Illinois Law Review Online, September 12, 2021, https://illinoislawreview.org/online/how-the-roberts-court-has-changed-labor-and-employment-law/.

Supreme Court justices collectively cast 134 votes in the 15 cases discussed in this article. Those cases spanned civil procedure, constitutional law, and statutory interpretation. There is no unifying judicial philosophy—such as originalism or textualism123—that neatly explains why conservative justices would reliably vote in one manner and liberal justices in the opposite manner for these cases. Yet, if all one knew was that conservative justices favor employers and liberal justices favor workers, that person would have correctly predicted 132 of the 134 votes cast (98.5%).124

[Footnote 125] There is no such thing as a judicial philosophy that explicitly favors workers or employers. See e.g., Noah Feldman, Democrats’ Misguided Argument Against Gorsuch, Bloomberg (Mar. 15, 2017, 7:30 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2017-03-15/democrats-misguided-argument-against-gorsuch [https://perma.cc/WQ6V-KBWV] (“But the thing is, siding with workers against employers isn’t a jurisprudential position. It’s a political stance.”). [End FN 125] If judicial philosophy rather than political motivation explained the underlying dynamics, and we assume that judicial philosophy in the abstract is no more likely to favor employers than workers,125 then the Court’s collective votes are the equivalent of flipping a coin 134 times and getting heads 132 times. Statistically, this is virtually impossible, occurring just 1 out of every 2.4 x 10^21 times *[\*ed: this is 1 in 2.4 sextillion, or 1 in 2.4 thousand trillion]*. Even if one assumes that the conservative wing is one ideological bloc and the liberal wing another ideological bloc, rather than a collection of individual votes, the numbers are still startling. In the 15 cases noted here, the blocs voted in unison as one would expect 29 of 30 times. Using the coin flip analogy, this should occur 1 in every 34.6 million times.

Justices Souter and Stevens often voted with the liberal wing despite being appointed by Republican presidents. Focusing on the 11 cases mentioned in this article since they retired, one could have correctly predicted 96 of 98 votes based on the party that nominated the justice (with Democrats favoring workers and Republicans favoring employers), which is also virtually impossible, occurring just 1 out of every 6.53 x 10^22 times. Alternatively, analyzing ideological blocs reaches substantially the same conclusion: the Democratic-appointed bloc voted for workers in each of the 11 cases, and the Republican-appointed bloc voted for employers in 10 of the 11 cases. Using the coin flip analogy, this should occur 1 in every 182,361 times.

Indeed, other studies analyzing voting patterns have demonstrated that each Republican appointed justice is “more favorable to business” than each Democratic appointed justice,126 which would be a remarkable coincidence if each justice was truly motivated by judicial philosophy.127

Justices on either side of the divide of the Roberts Court may find it both individually and institutionally expedient to claim that they are merely applying an objective judicial philosophy. At least on labor and employment law, that theory does not appear explanatory. Instead, the sizable percentage of the public that believes that the Court is driven by politics128 may have a point, despite what the justices on that Court may claim.

The result of that pattern is a legal playing field that significantly favors employers relative to the rules that existed prior to 2005. Further, with the confirmation of Justice Coney Barrett, the Court now has six conservative justices, none of whom appear close to retirement based on their age.129 As a result, the Court is likely to continue issuing decisions, perhaps for decades to come, consistent with its recent practice.

#### SCOTUS is immovable.

Boehm and Ta 24 – Trial Attorney at the National Labor Relations Board.

David Boehm and Lynn Ta, “The Promise of America’s Forgotten Labor Law,” LPE Project, 09-26-2024, https://lpeproject.org/blog/the-promise-of-americas-forgotten-labor-law/

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the labor movement faced a nearly immovable obstacle: the federal judiciary. Courts frequently deployed antitrust law, meant to restrain monopolists, as a bludgeon against organized labor. They also regularly enjoined strikes and solidarity activities. In one particularly infamous 1927 case, for instance, the Supreme Court essentially shut down all union organizing in West Virginia’s coalfields and prohibited, among other things, holding meetings, distributing information, distributing funds for striking workers, and urging workers to join the union.

In response, organized labor successfully agitated for a labor-rights provision in the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914. In evocative terms, the Act declared that “the labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce,” and that labor and agricultural organizations could lawfully carry out their “legitimate objectives.” While it was hoped that this would be labor’s magna carta, the courts simply ignored it. Under the prevailing judicial view, employees could form unions, but they had no right to engage in self-help that would interfere with employers’ unfettered access to laborers, which was framed in property terms. This deflationary view of the Clayton Act would reach its highest prominence in the Supreme Court’s Tri-City Foundry decision, which found that the Act was simply declaratory of “what was the best practice always” and did not protect the means by which unions could accomplish their objectives, such as strikes and boycotts.

#### Every major case is aff.

Roser-Jones 24 – Professor of Law at The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law, J.D. from the University of Notre Dame, LLM from the University of Wisconsin.

Courtlyn G. Roser-Jones, “The Roberts Court and the Unraveling of Labor Law,” Minnesota Law Review, https://minnesotalawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/3.4\_Roser-Jones.pdf

Few laws are tailored to suit our democracy more than the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Wagner Act).1 When Congress enacted the NLRA in 1935, it embraced a national policy committed to overcoming widespread power and wealth disparities between workers and their employers.2 Patterned off of the legislative mandate, American labor law evolved into a rich tapestry of doctrines and procedures—all woven together to reflect the functional realities of labor-management relations and balance conflicting concerns. More recently, though, labor law has been unraveling at the hands of the Supreme Court.3 Led by a conservative majority, the Roberts Court has heightened standards of constitutional review for labor activities, narrowly interpreted provisions of the NLRA, diminished the administrative role of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), and overruled decades-old labor precedent with little regard for stare decisis.4

Overruling precedent frays the edges of any substantive common law regime. But because labor’s doctrinal strands are deliberately entwined, negating one has cascading effects on the legal project that remains. As such, the Roberts Court’s impact on labor law has been far more significant than a few pro-business decisions.5 By centering individual interests over majority values and minimizing the NLRB’s administrative authority, the Court has disregarded the NLRA’s normative foundations and set the stage to unravel labor law’s entire uniform regime.6

The Court’s Janus v. AFSCME7 decision, which prohibited unions from collecting “agency” or “fair share” fees from publicsector employees, was easy to criticize.8 Decided 5-4 along party lines, some viewed Janus’s routing of a standard union security measure on First Amendment grounds as evincing the Court’s decidedly partisan agenda.9 Other scholars were puzzled by the majority’s willingness to ignore the High Court’s own heavily relied upon precedent.10 And others, still, decried Janus’s understanding that agency fees involved fundamental First Amendment interests at all—fearing that Janus would extend to other government-compelled subsidies such as professional dues, student activity fees, and even taxes.11 But five years have now gone by since Janus, and commentary on the Court’s political nature remains as loud as ever, collectively bargained-for contracts still exist (if some without agency fees), and Janus has not polluted the rest of the First Amendment’s compelled-speech or subsidy landscape.12 Instead, time has revealed Janus’s true legacy to be something else. Subsequent Janus-extending litigation unmasks Janus as just the beginning of a critical unraveling period for labor law—not the end of one single union-bolstering precedent.

This Article situates Janus within a larger unraveling of labor’s private-ordering and majoritarian legal regime. Janus’s rejection of agency fees did not just ignore labor law’s complimentary union obligation to represent agency-fee-paying employees. As others have noted, Janus upsets several labor doctrines that also rest on the long-held distinction between “political” and “economic” labor activities or “speech.”13 Now involving significant political speech interests in the public sector, organizing and collective bargaining restrictions, representative elections, grievance processing, and limitations on strikes and picketing all require a new balancing against state interests.14 But Janus’s uncertainties are not limited to speech rights or the public sector.15 In subsequent terms, the Court has expanded other First Amendment rights and property protections along these same interpretive lines, such that private and individual interests eclipse group concerns in a variety of organized public and private sector labor contexts.16

While the tension between labor’s majority rule and the Court’s safeguarding of minority interests is not new, in the past, agency deference norms kept them (mostly) at bay.17 But the Roberts Court has taken on a more authoritative role in labor law.18 Coupling its disregard for analytically sound agency interpretations with an overall distrust of the administrative state, in the 2023 term the Court flirted with doing away with the NLRB’s preemptive jurisdiction over labor matters “arguably protected” by the NLRA.19 And while the Court in Glacier Northwest, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters ultimately left intact the doctrine of preemption that tasks a centralized administrative agency with adjudicating labor disputes and administering labor law and legal protections,20 the decision is a harbinger of more uncertain times ahead. Glacier Northwest, Inc. implies that well-drafted complaints alleging unprotected striking activity may survive a motion to dismiss in the future— at least until the NLRB issues a complaint—Justices Thomas and Gorsuch wrote separately in support of doing away with NLRB preemption altogether.21 These opinions clear a path to replacing the Board’s holistic appraisals of labor law and its connected parts with this Court’s own “Lochnerized” understandings of individual labor doctrines.22

### Bonds Not Key---2NC

#### It’s all fine

Manoukian 25 – JP Morgan US Head of Investment Strategy, Bachelor’s in Economics from Middlebury College

Jacob Manoukian, “A ‘monster?’ A ‘time bomb?’ How to see the real danger from U.S. debt,” JP Morgan, 9/16/2025, https://privatebank.jpmorgan.com/nam/en/insights/markets-and-investing/ideas-and-insights/a-monster-a-time-bomb-how-to-see-the-real-danger-from-us-debt

\*Charts omitted

U.S. debt in reality

People focused on a debt crisis believe there is wisdom in Margaret Thatcher’s famous line: “You eventually run out of other people’s money.” However, there are no signs today that markets are unwilling to finance the United States government.

Households (both directly and through mutual funds) and foreign investors have remained avid buyers of newly issued U.S. debt. In July, when Treasury auctioned $42 billion worth of 10-year notes, buyers lined up with demand that exceeded supply by 2.5 times. This demand has kept interest rates in check even as the government debt load has soared.

Four recent economic studies have found that downward pressure on interest rates from an aging population and demographic trends have more than offset the upward pressure from increasing government debt over the last few decades.

This dynamic appears likely to persist: Economists from the National Bureau of Economic Research recently found that demand for U.S. government debt is set to outpace supply for the next 50 years.5

In other words, despite these long-lived concerns about excessive debt, global savers still consider the U.S. Treasury market the best option, and the dollar remains entrenched as the world’s currency.

Some investors also fret about the implications of the United States being heavily indebted to foreign nations such as Japan and China. However, the share of national debt held by foreigners peaked in 2008 and has declined by almost 20 percentage points since. As this chart shows, China now holds less than 5% of all publicly held U.S. long-term Treasury securities.6

For an example of a sovereign that is losing credibility with markets, consider the United Kingdom. We track the share of trading days that see a simultaneous decline in a country’s currency, equity and bond markets. This chart shows that the situation in the United Kingdom is rapidly declining toward the status of an emerging market such as Brazil.

What debt crises look like

What, then, does history say about “debt crises?” The last time the United States flirted with one, in the 1930s, Washington did not stiff its creditors—it devalued the dollar relative to gold and voided clauses that allowed bondholders to be paid in gold. Many scholars describe this as a shadow default.7 More broadly, since 1900, true sovereign defaults have usually followed defeat or regime collapse after war (e.g., Germany and Japan after World War II and the U.S.S.R. after the Cold War).

Ultimately, markets are viewing U.S. debt with the rational view of an underwriter, not the sensational view of a bond vigilante. Investors know the country’s strengths: A dynamic economy driven by a consistent track record of innovation at scale suggests that the tax base ought to grow. Further, U.S. tax collections as a share of GDP are near the low end among OECD nations, suggesting there is space to raise revenue if necessary.

### !D---Chemicals---2NC

#### Synthetic endocrine disruption is negligible — potencies and exposure are too low AND they fail to bind when competing with natural hormones.

Autrup et al. 20 – Ph.D. in Experimental Pathology from the University of Nairobi, Head of Human Carcinogenesis Laboratory at the Danish Cancer Society

Herman Autrup, Member of the IARC Scientific Advisory Board; Frank A. Barile, Professor of Applied and Clinical Toxicology in the Department of Pharmaceutical Sciences at St. John’s University, Ph.D. in Toxicology from St. John’s; Sir Colin Berry; Professor of Cardiology and Imaging at the University of Glasgow, Ph.D. in Cardiovascular Science and M.D. from the University of Glasgow; Bas J. Blaauboer; Alan Boobis; Herrmann Bolt; Christopher J. Borgert; Wolfgang Dekant; Daniel Dietrich; Jose L. Domingo; Gio Batta Gori; Helmut Greim; Jan Hengstler; Sam Kacew; Hans Marquardt; Olavi Pelkonen; Kai Savolainen; Pat Heslop-Harrison; Nico P. Vermeulen, “Human exposure to synthetic endocrine disrupting chemicals (S-EDCs) is generally negligible as compared to natural compounds with higher or comparable endocrine activity. How to evaluate the risk of the S-EDCs?” Toxicology in Vitro, Vol. 67, Pages 104862, April 30th, 2020, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0887233320303209?via%3Dihub

\*S-EDCs = Synthetic Endocrine-Disrupting Chemicals; N-EDCs = Natural Endocrine-Disrupting Chemicals \*\*

These and an array of other studies show that human exposure to NEDCs to be several orders of magnitude higher than to S-EDCs. In contrast, the daily intake of most S-EDCs is significantly lower, e.g. that of BPA is approximately 35 ng/kg/day, i.e. a factor 3000 lower than that of isoflavonoids. Despite these much higher exposures, a definite conclusion on putative beneficial or adverse effects of N-EDCs in humans remains elusive, further reinforcing the lack of evidence for adverse effects of S-EDCs, owing to their much lower exposures and potencies.

7. Conclusion and recommendation to evaluate the risks of human exposure to S-EDCs

As outlined above, the potencies of S-EDCs are much lower than for N-EDCs, drugs or endogenous hormones. Therefore, at the low human exposures that have been demonstrated in all sensibly conducted studies, S-EDCs have virtually no chance to physiologically compete with natural hormones in binding to free receptors. This implies that the health risks of the known S-EDCs are nil or at least negligible. On these grounds and with the conservative assumption of similar endocrine mechanisms for S-EDCs, N-EDC and endogenous hormones, it is proposed to compare S-EDCs potencies with standard N-EDCs using appropriate in vitro test systems. Selection of the reference N-EDCs should be based on their potencies compared to the corresponding physiological hormones. When the potency of an S-EDC is similar or lower than for the N-EDC standard, further studies and regulatory consequences will not be warranted.

#### Major PFA sources are being banned by the FDA AND companies are willingly complying.

Jones 24 – Deputy Commissioner for Foods at Food and Drug Administration

Jim Jones, “FDA, Industry Actions End Sales of PFAS Used in US Food Packaging,” FDA, February 28th, 2024, https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-industry-actions-end-sales-pfas-used-us-food-packaging

Today, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) issued a notice in the Federal Register announcing its determination that 35 food contact notifications (FCNs) related to per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) are no longer effective. The agency has determined that the uses of these 35 FCNs have been abandoned because the manufacturers or suppliers have ceased production, supply, or use of the food contact substances. The 35 FCNs had previously authorized food contact substances used for grease-proofing coatings applied to paper and paperboard packaging to prevent leaking of oil and water.

Today’s announcement is the latest effort in a series of activities that the FDA has taken to address certain PFAS substances, dating back to the early 2000s. In July 2020, manufacturers or suppliers of the food contact substances voluntarily agreed to phase-out their sales of the grease-proofing substances that contained PFAS. In February 2024, the FDA announced that all grease-proofing substances containing PFAS are no longer being sold by manufacturers for food contact use in the U.S. market.